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In the Matter of the Estate of 
Edward Miller Grimra, 
Deceased* 
Maxine Tate Grimra, individually 
and as Supervised Personal 
Representative of the Estate of 
Edward Miller Grimm; Linda 
Grimm; Edward Miller Grimm II; 
and E. LaVar Tate, as 
Supervised Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of Edward Miller Grimra, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v* 
Ethel Grimra Roberts, Rex 
Roberts, Juanita Grimra Morris, 
and Juanita Kegley Grimra, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Third District, Tooele County 
The Honorable John A. Rokich 
Attorneys: Daniel L. Berman and Peggy A, Torasic, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellants 
Harold G* Christensen, R. Brent Stephens, and Craig S. 
Cook, Salt Lake City, for Respondents 
Before Judges Billings, Garff, and Croft1. 
CROFT, Judge: 
Plaintiffs (appellants) appeal fror. a final judgment of the 
district court entered April 25, 1986• Defendants (respondents) 
1. Bryant H. Croft, Senior District Judge, sitting by special 
appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 78-3-24(10)(Supp, 1989). 
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AMENDED OPINION 
(For P u b l i c a t i o n ) 
Case No, 880708-CA 
cross-appeal from that portion of the judgment denying them 
attorney fees. 
Facts 
This litigation had its origin in the probate of two wills 
referred to as the Philippine will and the non-Philippine will, 
both executed on January 23, 1959, by Edward Miller Grimm2 
("Grimm"), who died on November 27, 1977. Grimm, a United 
States citizen, resided mainly in the Philippine Islands, 
although he had a secondary residence in Tooele County, Utah, 
and extensive business and property holdings both in the Far 
East and in the western United States, 
At the time of his death, Grimm was survived by his wife, 
Maxine Tate Grftiun ("Maxine"), whom he married on June 25, 1947, 
and their two children, Edward Miller Grimm II ("Pete") and 
Linda Grimm ("Linda"). Maxine, Pete, and Linda are the 
appellants in this action. Grimm was divorced from his first 
wife, Juanita Kegley Grimm ("Juanita"), in Reno, Nevada, by a 
decree entered June 2, 1947. Two daughters were born of this 
marriage, Ethel Grimm Roberts .("Ethel") and Juanita Grimm 
Morris ("Nita").- Nita, Ethel,* and Ethel's husband, Rex 
Roberts, are the respondents in this action. 
The Philippine will governed all of Grimm's property 
situated in the Philippines. It named Maxine, Charles Parsons 
("Parsons"), and Byron S. Huie ("Huie") as co-executors, noting 
that Parsons and Huie both resided in Manila. It declared his 
Philippine properties community property, and directed the 
executors to deliver to Maxine that portion thereof which under 
the Philippine laws constituted her share of the community 
property. It also bequeathed to Maxine his cars, furniture and 
furnishings, musical instruments, jewelry and clothing situated 
in the Philippines at the time of his death. He named his four 
children, Pete, Linda, Ethel and Nita, end directed that the 
residue of his Philippine estate be distributed according to 
Philippine "legitime" or compulsory heir law. This division 
resulted in Ethel and Nita each being entitled to 3.7% of the 
2. In January 1966, Grimm executed codicils to both wills, the 
provisions of which related to disposition of his property in 
the event he and Maxine, or they, Pete and Linda, should all die 
in a common disaster. Such did not occur and the codicils are 
not relevant to the issues of this case. 
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Philippine estate. As to that portion of his Philippine estate 
over which he had the power and freedom of testamentary 
disposition under Philippine law, he bequeathed 16% to two 
sisters and a brother and 84% to Maxine, Linda, and Pete in 
equal shares. 
The non-Philippine will purported to dispose of his 
property, both real and personal, not situated in the 
Philippines. Under this will, Maxine received all real 
property located outside the Philippines. Grimm bequeathed the 
remainder of his non-Philippine estate 50% to Maxine and 25% to 
each of Linda and Pete. Grimm in his will stated he was 
purposely making no provision for Nita and Ethel, because he 
had provided for each of them in a separate will disposing of 
Mhis Philippine property." This will named Maxine and E. LaVar 
Tate ("Tate") as co-executors. 
Both wills contained the following spendthrift clause: 
No beneficiary of my estate shall have any 
right to alienate, encumber, or hypothecate 
his or her interest in said estate or the 
income therefrom, nor shall such interest of 
any beneficiary be subject to claims of his 
or her creditors or liable to attachment, 
execution, or other process of law. 
On July 19, 1977, Grimm executed a trust agreement naming 
Pete as trustee. We discuss the details of this trust when 
dealing with its legal effect. In August of 1977, Grimm executed 
42 assignments of property interests to Pete "as trustee." 
After Grimm's death, the relations between the two branches 
of his family became strained, due in part, at least, to the 
emergence of the trust agreement. Lawyers were retained by both 
factions, and conflicts, including tax issues, arose that needed 
resolution.3 Ethel, under proceedings initiated on December 
29, 1977 in Philippine court, had herself appointed special 
administratrix, alleging that Grimm had died intestate. This 
appointment became another source of conflict among the parties. 
3. One such question related to the validity of Grimm*s 1947 
Nevada divorce from Juanita and hence the validity of his 
marriage to Maxine. The record discloses that Grimm commenced 
the Nevada divorce action but Juanita appeared, answered, and 
counterclaimed for divorce, and was in i:act awarded the decree of 
divorce from Grimm. 
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Finally, after extensive and contiruous negotiations/ a 
Family Settlement Agreement ("FSA") was sxecuted on April 25, 
1978 by Maxine, Linda, and Pete as First Parties and Juanita, 
Nita, and Ethel as Second Parties* 
The FSA consisted of two documents: the Agreement and a 
Supplemental Memorandum. The Agreement provided that Grimm* s 
estate included all property owned by Grimm at the time of his 
death and all property that Maxine had or claimed to have under 
any community property laws;- that from the estate there was to 
be set apart a "marital share" for Maxine as defined therein, 
which in no event was to be less than $1,500,000 plus the home 
in the Philippines and the home in Tooele County. The -net 
distributable estate" was defined as all of the estate 
available for distribution after deducting the marital share 
and all debts of Grimm, claims against the estate, expenses of 
administration, all inheritance and estate taxes, all bequests 
to Grimm's sisters and brother, accounting and legal fees 
incurred in administering the estate, and certain other 
enumerated items. The net distributable? estate was to be 
shared equally by Linda, Pete, Nita, anc Ethel. 
The Supplemental Memorandum provided that any property 
transferred to Pete as trustee under the trust Agreement of 
July 12, 1977, would be included in the estate of Grimm. It 
also specifically identified which bank accounts were or were 
not to be included in the net distributable estate defined in 
the Agreement. 
Litigation over the FSA was triggered when Ethel and Nita 
filed a petition in the probate case seeking the removal of 
Maxine and Tate as personal representatives for failure to move 
the probate proceedings forward. In response, appellants filed 
a 13-count civil action against respondents on September 10, 
1980, to which respondents filed an ansver.4 
In summary, respondents below contended the settlement 
agreement should be enforced and implemented. Appellants, in 
twelve claims for relief, generally alleged that the FSA should 
be declared void, unenforceable, of no effect, and rescinded. 
Each claim sets forth its own allegations to support that 
goal. The validity of the FSA was'the major issue of this 
case. However, appellants also claimed intentional infliction 
of emotional distress. 
4. Also on September 10, 1980, appellants filed an 11-count 
counterclaim to the removal petitions, said 11 counts being 
identical to 11 of the 13 counts in the civil case. The case as 
tried involved a consolidation of the two cases. 
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Trial in the case was set for August 6, 1985. Appellants 
filed a demand for jury trial, and respondents objected. 
Respondents contended appellants were not entitled to a jury 
trial as their claims were equitable. Appellants argued their 
claims for compensatory and punitive damages, and particularly 
the one for intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
asserted legal claims necessitating a jury decision. 
The court ruled that plaintiffs would be given the benefit 
of having a jury, but stated: "So that everybody understands, 
the court will make the decision as to whether or not the FSA is 
valid or invalid,- and then based upon that decision, if 
defendants pursue their counterclaim, tie plaintiffs could not 
contend they didn't have the right for the jury to hear all of 
the defenses "with regard to coercion, distress, and other 
defenses.H 
After a ten-day trial in August 1985, the court ruled in 
favor of respondents and entered its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law on April 25, 1986. 
By its judgment, the court ruled (1) the FSA was a valid and 
binding agreement; (2) that it was just and reasonable and, to 
the extent approval of the court was necessary, it was approved 
by the court; (3) the estate was to be distributed in accordance 
with the FSA. Respondents" claim for attorneys* fees was 
denied. This appeal and cross-appeal followed. 
Issues on Appeal 
We must resolve the following issues on appeal: 
1. Whether the court erred in ruling the FSA was a valid 
and binding agreement; 
2. What effect, if any, does the Trust Agreement have upon 
the validity of the FSA? 
3. Could the court approve the FSA under Utah Code Ann. 
75-3-1102(c) (1978) without notice to two co-executors of 
the Philippine will? 
4. Were appellants entitled to a jury trial on the 
affirmative defenses of duress and failure of consideration 
asserted in response to respondents:- counterclaim or upon 
appellants' claim for damages for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress? 
880708-CA 5 
5. Whether the court's findings and conclusions were 
fundamentally inadequate. 
6- Did the court err in denying an award of attorney fees 
to respondents? 
Validity of the FSA 
The fundamental issue presented is whether the FSA is 
enforceable even though it was not formally approved by the court 
before appellants' repudiation. Appellants contend that under 
the "plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1101- and -settled 
authority," the FSA could be repudiated at any time prior to 
court approval. They claim they repudiated the FSA when they 
filed their counterclaim to the removal petition filed by Ethel 
and Nita and their complaint in the civil case. Appellants 
stress that respondents did not in their pleadings at any time 
prior to respondents' filing their counterclaim in 19855 seek 
or receive court approval of the FSA. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1101 (1978) provides: 
A compromise of any controversy as to 
. . . the rights or interests in the estate 
of the decedent, . . . if approved in a 
formal proceeding in the court for that 
purpose, is binding on all the parties 
thereto/ including those unborn/ 
unascertained/ or who could not be located. 
An approved compromise is binding even 
though it may affect a trust or an 
inalienable interest. 
Appellants cite In re Estate of Chasel, 725 P.2d 1345/ 1348 
(Utah 1986) for the proposition that "compromise agreements 
authorized by Part 11 of the Probate Code must be approved in 
formal proceedings." However, the quoted language is clearly 
5. Appellants' brief fixes the date of filing of respondents' 
counterclaim as February 9, 1985# some "four years" after their 
repudiation of the FSA. The probate case file shows respondents 
filed their counterclaim on August 10/ 1983/ together with their 
amended petition for removal of Maxine and Tate as personal 
representatives. The civil case file shows a copy of it was not 
placed in that file until July 29# 1985. 
dictum. In Chasel, the court had already approved the 
settlement agreement. It was only when Chasel, after finding 
three previously unknown wills, moved to set aside the 
compromise agreement that the court refused to reopen the 
issue. The Supreme Court stated he could not reopen the 
probate because section 75-3-1101 stated that a compromise 
agreement, "if approved in a formal proceeding in the court for 
that purpose, is binding on all the parties thereto.- The 
court did not decide the issue as to whether or not a FSA not 
approved by the court was binding upon the parties to the 
compromise agreement, the issue present here. 
We do not read Part 11 of the Probate Code as 
-authorizing" compromise agreements, but rather as authorizing 
-approval in formal probate proceedings' of such agreements in 
the manner set forth in section 75-3-11C2, with the result that 
an approved agreement is binding even on interested persons not 
party to it. However, section 75-3-1101 does not invalidate an 
otherwise valid compromise agreement between the parties prior 
to court approval. 
This position is further supported by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-3-912: 
Subject to the rights of creditors and 
taxing authorities, competent successors may 
agree among themselves to alter the 
interests, shares, or amounts to which they 
are entitled under the will of the decedent, 
or under the laws of intestacy, in any way 
that they provide in a written contract 
executed by all who are affected by its 
provisions. 
This section does not require that such an agreement must be 
submitted to the probate court for its approval. 
The Michigan case of In re Peck's Estate. 323 Mich. 11, 34 
N.W.2d 533 (1948) is further authority to support the trial 
court's conclusion that the settlement agreement was binding 
between the parties without court approval. In that case, a 
controversy developed between decedent's widow and the trustee of 
the estate. The parties entered into a settlement arrangement 
that was never approved by the probate court. The Supreme Court 
of Michigan nevertheless enforced the agreement, stating: 
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It was not necessary to secure the consent 
of the probate court to the settlement as 
there were no minors or unknown heirs 
involved. The court encourages settlements 
where there is no fraud or mistake and the 
parties are of age, particularly so where 
there is a full understanding of the 
provisions in the settlement and the parties 
are represented by able counsel. 
Id., 34 N.W.2d at 538. The court further found: "[The probate 
code] does not prevent settlement of controversies by parties 
legally competent to act in their own behalf."6 
In further support of respondents' position, an annotation 
states: 
In accord with the general policy of 
law which favors the compromise of 
controversies and the avoidance or 
termination of litigation [citing 15 Am. 
Jur. 2d, Compromise and Settlement, § 4] it 
6. The first sentences of the Michigan statute and Utah Code 
Ann. § 912 are identical. Michigan did not enact separate 
statutes such as 1101 and 1102. But The. balance of the 
Michigan statute provides that where interested parties include 
minors or incapacitated persons, after notice, the probate 
court may, if the agreement is made in good faith and appears 
just and reasonable for such persons, direct the representative 
of the person or interest to sign or enter into the agreement. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1101 makes the court approval binding on 
all parties thereto, including those unborn, unascertained, or 
who could not be located. Section 75-3-1102 sets out the 
method to obtain court approval, including parents executing 
the agreement on behalf of a minor child, and states that after 
notice, the court may, if it finds the contest or controversy 
is in good faith and that the effect of the agreement upon 
interests of persons represented by fiduciaries or other 
representatives is just and reasonable, make an order approving 
the agreement and directing all fiduciaries under its 
supervision to execute the agreement. The Editorial Board 
Comment for sections 75-3-1101 and -1102 of the Utah Uniform 
Probate Code states that they are modeled after section 93 of 
the Model Probate Code "Comparable legislative provisions have 
proved quite useful in Michigan.- We are persuaded that In re 
Peck is in point despite slightly different language in the 
statutes. 
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is said that the law looks with favor upon 
an agreement of compromise among members 
of a family which avoids a will contest or 
promotes the settlement and distribution 
of the testator's estate, or, as it is 
sometimes stated, that such agreements are 
favorites of the law.7 
Where all the persons interested in 
the estate of a testator as heirs or 
beneficiaries under the will are legally 
competent to contract, they may settle 
controversies by agreement and need not 
seek the approval of the court under the 
statute.8 
Section 75-3-1102 does not require court approval for a 
settlement to be binding upon its signatories. It merely 
outlines the procedures for securing coirt approval of a 
compromise in order for it to bind those not before the court. 
Appellants further argue duress as grounds for declaring 
the FSA to be void. In the weeks preceding execution of the 
FSA both sides were represented by able counsel. Maxine 
retained David Salisbury as her attorney while she was in 
Utah. He was advised by Maxine that while some basic 
agreements with respondents had been reached in the 
Philippines, she wanted him to draft the FSA. In 
correspondence, she said she no longer felt pressured. 
Salisbury spent many hours negotiating with Donald Holbrook as 
counsel for respondents. Pete, being in Utah and conferring 
with Salisbury, was granted a power of attorney by Maxine in 
order to act on her behalf. The prolonged and extensive 
assistance of counsel by both sides rebuts appellants 
contentions that the FSA was a product c.f duress. We do not 
find the trial court's ruling on the issue of duress clearly 
erroneous• 
Appellants also claim lack of consideration as a basis for 
declaring the FSA void. However, respondents answer that 
consideration consisted of good faith issues that blocked 
disposition of Grimm*s estate, and which were compromised as 
part of the FSA: whether the 42 assignments to Pete as trustee 
of Grimm*s assets were valid as to execution and delivery; 
7. Annotation, Family Settlement of Testator's Estate. 29 
A.L.R.3d 8, 25, 125 (1970). 
8. IdL at 125. 
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whether the Internal Revenue Service and/or the Philippine 
taxing authorities had all the facts for determining the 
estatefs tax liability, which was finally settled and paid 
after execution of the FSA; difficulties that confronted the 
parties in dealing with Parsons (Grimmfs partner) and reaching 
an agreement with him as to the estate's interest in companies 
in which they were jointly involved, and whether Juanita^s 
divorce from Grimm and Maxine's marriage to him were valid. 
We agree that a legitimate controversy as to what assets 
constitute the Philippine estate existec. Grimm had assigned 42 
interests to Pete as trustee one month after the trust agreement 
was executed, which, if upheld, would have very substantially 
reduced the Philippine estate to which Ethel and Nita were 
partially entitled.9 Each asset was assigned to Pete "as 
trustee.- No mention was made of the trust agreement executed 
in July, 1977, nor of any terms and conditions applied to the 
assets so assigned. 
In G. Bogert, Law of Trusts, § 11 at 24 (5th ed. 1973), it 
is stated: 
Even if the intent to create a trust is 
assumed, it cannot be effective unless 
certain essential trust element s are 
properly described, namely, the subject 
matter, the trust purpose, and the 
beneficiaries. 
In Sundauist v. Sundauist. 639 P.2d 181, 184 (Utah 1981), the 
Supreme Court said that in the creation of a trust, the trust 
property must be clearly specified and set aside, and the 
••essential terms of the trust must be clear enough for the court 
to enforce the equitable duties that are the sine qua non of a 
trust relationship." 
Standing alone, it is not clear that the properties 
described in the assignments were intended to become part of the 
trust estate created by the trust agreement of July, 1977, nor 
that they are subject to the restriction on alienation contained 
in the spendthrift clause of that agreement• We have no need to 
9. If these assignments were valid, the only assets remaining in 
the Philippine estate appear to be a receivable from Everett 
Steamship Company consisting of three payments of $984,092.31 
each, due June 30 in each of the years ?.978, 1979, and 1980, and 
any Philippine real estate. 
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decide such questions, but only whether they present a good 
faith issue with respect to the issue of consideration for the 
FSA. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has stated in several cases that 
consideration for an accord may consist of a compromise of a 
bona fide dispute which is not necessarily well-founded but is 
in good faith. Etgt, Golden Kev Realty. Inc. v. Mantas, 699 
P.2d 730 (Utah 1985); Suoarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 
P.2d 1369 (Utah 1980); Ashton v. Skeen, 85 Utah 489, 39 P.2d 
1073 (1935). in Suoarhouse Finance, the court stated: 
No completely satisfactory and 
comprehensive definition of consideration 
h^s ever been devised. It is generally 
agreed, however, that where a promise is 
supported by the incurrence, on the part 
of the promisee, of a legal detriment in 
order to confer a benefit on the promisor, 
such is sufficient to serve as 
consideration, thereby rendering the 
promise legally enforceable. . . . 
[Consideration is often found in the 
obligor's agreement . . . to surrender the 
assertion of a legally enforceable right. 
610 P.2d at 1372 (footnotes omitted). 
The trial court found respondents asserted in good faith 
the possible invalidity of the trust, possible invalidity of 
Grimm's divorce, and the effect of the application of 
Philippine laws; that mutual promises for the sake of family 
harmony constituted consideration; that the parties were united 
in dealing with taxing authorities and with Parsons; that the 
Philippine estate tax was reduced by making it unnecessary for 
Ethel and Nita to assert that the entire estate (except for 
real property in Daggett County) was subject to distribution 
and taxation under Philippine law; and that respondents did not 
know that whether the claims they asserted were unfounded. We 
conclude that the trial court #s finding of a consideration to 
support the FSA, from our review of the record, was not clearly 
erroneous. 
In summary, we find the FSA is a valid contract and does 
not require court approval under sections 75-3-1101 and -1102. 
We further find that in the absence of illegality, fraud, 
duress, undue influence, or mistake, it was not subject to 
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repudiation by appellants. Chasel, 725 P.2d at 1345. The FSA 
was a compromise of a probate dispute. The issue as to its 
validity was clearly equitable, and thus for the court to 
decide. The court's findings will be upheld on appeal unless 
clearly erroneous. Utah R. Civ. Pro. 52(a); In re Estate of 
Bartell, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989); Bailev v. Call, 767 P.2d 138, 
139 (Utah App. 1989). The record does not support any finding 
of illegality, fraud, duress, undue influence, or mistake such 
as would justify repudiation. Furthermore, from a thorough 
review of the record, we do not find the court's ruling in 
respondents* favor with respect to appellants claims of fraud, 
unjust enrichment, failure to obtain signatures of persons 
-affected" by the FSA, breach of duty by Ethel under the 
probate proceedings in the Philippines, and breach of the FSA, 
to be clearly erroneous. 
Effect of the Trust Agreement on the FSA 
Appellants allege the Supplemental Agreement of the FSA 
expressly provides that any property transferred to the trustee 
pursuant to the trust would be included in the estate of the 
decedent for the purposes of the FSA and that this provision, 
if enforced, would have the effect of destroying decedentfs 
intent as to disposition of his estate under the trust. 
Appellants claim the law is clear that beneficiaries may 
not alter or terminate a trust if it wovld frustrate a material 
purpose of the trust;10 that case law holds that a court with 
statutory power to approve a FSA will not do so if it 
terminates or materially alters a spendthrift trust; and that 
under such cases the court should have iejected the FSA because 
it terminated or materially altered the spendthrift trust. In 
candor, appellants acknowledge the Restatement Second of Trusts 
adopts a modified rule to the effect that an agreement to 
modify a spendthrift trust will not be effective to terminate 
the trust unless approved by the court as for the best 
interests of a beneficiary. They then set forth some reasons 
why it would not be for their best interests and say the court 
made no finding that would support court approval under the 
-best interest- standard. 
Respondents assert that the cases cited are in accord with 
the general rule of law applying to trusts, but are 
10. Sundauist v. Sundauist, 639 P.2d ltl (Utah 1981). 
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inapplicable to this case because: (1) Jrhe trust is illusory 
and contains few assets; (2) Appellants ^ renounced any interest 
in the trust and are estopped from utilising it to avoid the 
FSA; (3) Section 75-3-1101 specifically allows a FSA to be 
binding even if it affects a trust or inalienable interest; (4) 
It was in the best interests of appellants as beneficiaries to 
enter into the FSA, 
We have found the FSA to be a valid contract, even without 
court approval. However, the trial court in its judgment 
approved the FSA* Under Section § 75-3-1101, it is thus 
binding, even though it may affect a trust or an inalienable 
interest. 
Lack of Notice to Parsons and Huie 
The record before this court shows ithat this issue is 
raised by appellants for the first time (in their brief on 
appeal. The allegations of the eighth, Ininth, and tenth causes 
of action with respect to failure to give notice to interested 
parties contain no mention of Parsons or Huie. In accord with 
established case law, we do not further consider this issue.11 
Jury Trial 
Appellants asserted duress and failure of consideration as 
grounds to find the FSA invalid and unenforceable. Appellants 
contend they were entitled to have these issues decided by a 
jury because duress and lack of consideration were asserted as 
affirmative defenses to respondents* counterclaim seeking court 
approval of the FSA and damages. We disagree. Respondents put 
on no evidence in support of their claim for damages in their 
counterclaim, and hence, such affirmative defenses became moot. 
Count eleven of appellants' complaint alleged a claim for 
damages on behalf of appellants for the ^ intentional infliction 
11. Jolivet v. Cook. 115 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 19 (Utah 1989); 
Zion's First Nat'l Bank v. National American Title Ins. Co.. 749 
P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988); Salt Lake Citv Corp. v. James 
Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 46 (Utah App. 1988). 
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of emotional distress. Such conduct/ if proven, constitutes a 
tort.12 
In Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289,. 358 P*2d 344# 346-47 
(1961)# the Supreme Court stated: 
An action may be maintained foij severe 
emotional distress, though not ^ accompanied 
by bodily impact or physical injury, where 
the defendant intentionally engaged in some 
conduct toward the plaintiff/ (a) with the 
purpose of inflicting emotional distress, 
or, (b) where any reasonable persons would 
have known that such would result; and his 
actions are of such a nature as to be 
considered outrageous and intolerable in 
that they offend against the generally 
accepted standards of decency and morality. 
(footnote omitted). Samms is cited in Gvqi v. Storch, 28 Utah 2d 
399/ 503 P.2d 449, 450 (1972)/ wherein our Supreme Court quoted 
comment h to section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts/ as 
follows: 
It is for the court to determine/ in 
the first instance, whether the 
defendant's conduct may reasonably be 
regarded as so extreme and outrageous as 
to permit recovery, or whether it is 
necessarily so. Where reasonable men may 
differ, it is for the jury, subject to the 
control of the court/ to determine 
whether/ in the particular case, the 
conduct has been sufficiently extreme and 
outrageous to result in liability. 
In comment j of section 46 it is stated that: 
12. In Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 comment b (1965) it 
is stated that *[i]t is only within recent years that the rule 
stated in this section [on emotional distress] has been fully 
recognized as a separate and distinct be sis of tort liability. 
That section states as an element of the tort of causing severe 
emotional distress that the conduct be ••extreme and outrageous.* 
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The rule stated in this section applies only 
where the emotional distress has in fact 
resulted, and where it is severe. . . • It 
includes all highly unpleasant mental 
reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, 
shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, 
chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea. 
It is only where it is extreme that the 
liability arises. . . . The law intervenes 
only where the distress inflicted is so 
severe that no reasonable man could be 
expected to endure it. The intensity and 
the duration of the distress are factors to 
be considered in determining its severity. . . . 
It is for the court to determine whether, on 
the evidence severe emotional distress can 
be found; it is for the jury to determine 
whether, on the evidence, it h&s in fact 
existed. 
In support of her claim, Maxine made the following 
allegations: While at the hospital during Grimm's final illness, 
Ethel threatened that unless Maxine had Grimm execute a new will, 
she would cause trouble. (Maxine retained a Utah law firm in an 
effort to satisfy Ethel's demand). Rex told Maxine the 1947 
divorce between Grimm and Juanita was invalid and thus her 
marriage to Grimm was thus illegal, and they would commence court 
proceedings to so establish. Ethel and Rex broke into Maxine*s 
house and removed certain personal property, including a safe, 
which they refused to return unless Maxine signed the FSA. 
Without telling Maxine, Ethel tried to gain control of the estate 
by having herself appointed special administratrix in the 
Philippine court through a -perjurious- petition in which she 
alleged Grimm died intestate and declaring that she was the only 
heir in the Philippines and refused to release such appointment 
unless Maxine signed the FSA. Ethel and Rex threatened to cause 
trouble with the taxing authorities and^to interfere with a 
determination of Grimm's relationship with Parsons. Rex and 
Ethel continually pressured and harassed Maxine in March 1978 and 
entered Marine's home unannounced, where Ethel swore and screamed 
at Maxine. They repeated such threats and demands, which were 
emotionally and physically devastating to Maxine, resulting in 
hospitalization. Even after the signing of the FSA, Rex and 
Ethel continued their personal attacks against Maxine, resulting 
in a second hospitalization. 
The court ruled that appellants were not entitled to recover 
damages on their claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
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distress• In so doing, the court took that legal claim from the 
jury, in effect, directing a verdict. Therefore, we view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom 
the verdict is directed, and sustain the ruling only if there is 
no evidence or reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom to 
support an essential element of the claimant's prima facie case. 
Little America Refining Co. v. Levba, 641 P.2d 112, 114 (Utah 
1982); Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 749 
P.2d 660 (Utah App. 1988). 
Respondents contend that the trial court properly ruled on 
this issue because, among other reasons,13 appellants were not 
entitled as a matter of right to have this issue decided by a 
jury. In support, they assert that by choosing to integrate this 
cause of action with their equitable claims for rescission, 
appellants cannot now.claim a right to a jury trial. They cite 
Coleman v. Dillman. 624 P.2d 713 (Utah 1981) as authority for the 
proposition that, where the issues are predominately equitable in 
nature, a litigant is not entitled to a trial by jury on legal 
issues as a matter of right. We are not persuaded that early 
Utah authority cited by respondents, when read in context, 
supports this general proposition. State Bank of Lehi v. 
Woolsev, 765 P.2d 413 (Utah 1977); Sweeney v. Happy Vallev, Inc., 
18 Utah 2d 113, 417 P.2d 126 (1966). We are more persuaded by 
the reasoning in Vallev Mortuary v. Fairbanks, 119 Utah 204, 225 
P.2d 739 (1950), in which the Supreme Court, in an opinion in 
which Chief Justice Wolfe examined the issue at length, adopted 
the rule that where plaintiff unites an equitable and legal cause 
of action, "a jury trial should be accorded the parties on the 
issues of fact raised in the legal cause of action." 
i 
This rule is particularly compelling with the adoption of 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) governing compulsory 
counterclaims, which provides: 
13. Respondents also assert no reversible error occurred 
because (1) under Philippine law there is no cause of action for 
such claim without attendant physical injury; (2) if a cause of 
action did exist under Utah law, the court found as a matter of 
law that the "evidence did not state a claim"; and (3) if 
appellants were entitled to a jury determination of this issue, 
they waived it by failing to make proper objection. 
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A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any 
claim which at the time of ser\ing the 
pleading the pleader has against any 
opposing party, if it arises ou|t of the 
transaction or occurrence that jis the 
subject matter of the opposing party*s claim 
and does not require for its adjudication 
the presence of third parties of whom the 
court cannot acquire jurisdiction. 
Clearly, Marine's claim for damages for the intentional 
infliction of extreme emotional distress falls into the scope of 
a compulsory counterclaim. 
An annotation states as follows: 
The following federal cases dealing 
with the right to a jury trial of a legal 
counterclaim interposed in an equity suit 
were decided after the adoption of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Proceduie, under 
which a defendant is compulsorily required, 
subject to certain exceptions not relevant 
to the present discussion, to assert as a 
counterclaim any claim he has against the 
opposing party if it arises out of the 
transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject matter of the original action. This 
requirement is evidently applicable 
irrespective of whether the counterclaim is 
one in law, or in equity. Although the 
opinions in several of these cases do not so 
state, it would appear from the facts set 
forth that in all of these cases the legal 
counterclaims which were interposed were 
compulsorily required to be filed, and that 
they could not thereafter be independently 
asserted. Because of this fact, and for the 
reason that to hold otherwise would deny to 
the counterclaimant his constitutional right 
to a jury trial, it has been generally held 
that a legal counterclaim so filed in an 
equitable action must, on demand of either 
of the parties, be tried to a jury. 
Annotation, Right in Eguity Cases to Jury Trial of Counterclaim 
Involving Legal Issue, 17 ALR3d 1321, 1342 (1968) (footnote 
omitted). 
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The trial court ruled on appellants• claim for severe 
emotional distress and sent the jury hona after they had sat 
through this ten-day trial. We find upon our review of the 
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Maxine, that 
the evidence could have allowed a jury to find emotional 
distress and that it was therefore improper for the court to 
dismiss the claim. Thus we conclude Maxine was entitled to 
have her legal claim decided by a jury and so reverse that 
ruling and remand for a jury trial solely on that issue. The 
evidence does not support such a claim by Linda or Pete, nor as 
against Nita, so, as to these parties, the court's ruling is 
affirmed. 
Findings of Fact 
Appellants describe the court's findings as a "litany of 
omissions, half-truths, and unsubstantiated conclusionary 
findings" which as a whole constitute an abdication of the 
court's fundamental responsibility to fairly adjudicate and 
determine the facts pursuant to Utah Rul:e of Civil Procedure 
52(a). Findings of fact and conclusions of law will support a 
judgment, even though they are general, if they follow the 
allegations of well-formulated pleadings in most respects. 
Pearson v. Pearson. 561 P.2d 1080 (Utah 1977). Case law, early 
in Utah's history, fixed a trial court's duty to find upon all 
material issues raised by the pleadings. Piper v. Hatch. 86 
Utah 292, 43 P.2d 700 (1935); West v. Standard Fuel Co.. 81 
Utah 300, 17 P.2d 292 (1932). 
In summary, appellants state the inadequacies they allege 
require a new trial. The transcript of the trial reflects 
conflicts in the testimony, and it is not surprising that 
counsel do not agree on facts as found by the court based upon 
the evidence presented to it. Although findings should be made 
on all material subordinate and ultimate factual issues, it is 
not necessary that a court resolve all conflicting evidentiary 
issues. Sorenson v. Beers. 614 P.2d 159 (Utah 1980). 
As stated, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides 
that findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous. A finding attacked as lacking adequate evidentiary 
support is deemed "clearly erroneous" only if an appellate 
court concludes that the finding is against the clear weight of 
the evidence. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 896, 
899-900 (Utah 1989). We do not find the court's findings are 
against the clear weight of the evidence or so clearly 
880708-CA 18 
erroneous that failure to grant a new trial constitutes a 
denial of a fair trial- Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)-
Respondents' Claim for Attorneys Fees 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the court held an 
extensive hearing on the parties' respective motions for a 
directed verdict, following which the court advised counsel he 
was going to rule in respondents' favor. Upon hearing the 
court so state, counsel for respondents stated it had been 
agreed that the question of attorney fees# provided for in the 
FSA, would be submitted to the court, either by affidavit or in 
a further hearing. The findings of fact and conclusions of law 
make no mention of attorney fees, but the judgment of the court 
states: -Defendants' claim for attorney fees is denied." 
Respondents cross-appeal that ruling, seeking a reversal. 
A review of both the civil and probate files discloses that on 
September 9, 1985, the affidavit of R. Frent Stephens, as 
counsel for respondents, asserted a claim for attorneys' fees 
for the total amount of $149,490.60 based upon hourly rates set 
forth therein. Notice of taking the depositions of attorneys 
Harold Christensen and R. Brent Stephens was filed by 
appellants' counsel, together with subpoenas duces tecum, on 
September 13, 1985. Said attorneys filed a motion for a 
protective order from said notice on September 13, 1985. In a 
document entitled -Supplemental Objections and Comments to the 
Proposed Judgment of the Court," filed September 16, 1985, 
appellants contended there was no basis for attorney fees being 
awarded as the FSA was not binding until approved by the court 
and the court could not award attorney fees for legal services 
rendered prior to such approval. On March 3, 1986, counsel for 
appellants filed a notice of hearing to the effect that the 
issue of attorney fees would be heard before the court in Salt 
Lake City on March 17, 1986. Neither case file contains any 
further documents relevant to attorney fees. 
In Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates, 752 P.2d 892, 898 
(Utah 1988), the Supreme Court said: "Of pivotal concern to us 
is the lack of any findings to support the trial court's ruling 
that no attorney fee would be allowed. . . ." We have the same 
concern. In Martindale v. Adams, 777 P.2d 514, 518 (Utah App. 
1989), this court said: "To permit meaningful review on 
appeal, it is necessary that the trial court, on the record, 
identify such factors and otherwise explain the basis for its 
sua sponte reduction." 
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In the record/ respondents' affidavit in support of its 
requested fee is undisputed as to amount and reasonableness, 
with appellants contending that no fee should be awarded at 
all. The absence in the record before us of findings and 
conclusions on the issue of attorney feep compels remand to the 
trial court to correct that deficiency in the record. 
We therefore reverse the judgment on the claim for 
infliction of emotional distress and remand that claim for a 
trial by jury. We also remand the denial of attorneys fee for 
further proceedings or supplementation of the record. 
Otherwise, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
B^e&nt H. Croft, Judge v 
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CIVIL NO. C 80-0322 
Judge John A. Rokich 
T h i s c a u s e came on r e g u l a r l y f o r t r i a l on Tuesday, t h e 
6 th day of August, 1985. P l a i n t i f f s were represented by Daniel 
L. Berman, o f Berman & Anderson. Defendants Roberts and Morris 
were represented by Harold G. Christensen and R. Brent Stephens, 
o f Snow, C h r i s t e n s e n & Mart ineau . Defendant J u a n i t a Kegley 
Grimm was represented by David Eckersley, of Houpt & Eckers ley . 
A l though t h e p r i n c i p a l i s s u e i n d i s p u t e was t h e v a l i d i t y of 
t h e F a m i l y S e t t l e m e n t Agreement, a j u r y was du ly empaneled 
t o t r y any i s s u e s a p p r o p r i a t e f o r j u r y d e t e r m i n a t i o n a f t e r 
r e s o l u t i o n of the v a l i d i t y i s s u e . 
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The Cour t and j u r y h e a r d t h e t e s t i m o n y o f w i t n e s s e s , 
e x h i b i t s were o f f e r e d and r e c e i v e d i n t o e v i d e n c e , and upon 
b o t h s i d e s h a v i n g r e s t e d , and mot ions f o r D i r e c t e d V e r d i c t s 
h a v i n g been made, t h e T r i a l Court announced t h a t h i s d e c i s i o n 
was t h a t a l l i s s u e s were determined in favor of the defendants , 
whereupon the jury was d i scharged . 
The Court b e i n g f u l l y a d v i s e d and h a v i n g announced h i s 
d e c i s i o n , now makes and e n t e r s the fo l lowing 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 . On F e b r u a r y 2 2 , 1 9 2 6 , Edward M i l l e r Grimm (GRIMM) 
m a r r i e d d e f e n d a n t Juanita Kegley Grimm (JUANITA) . They res ided 
i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e I s l a n d s from 1926 u n t i l 1937. Two chi ldren 
w e r e b o r n o f t h a t m a r r i a g e , d e f e n d a n t E t h e l Grimm Roberts 
(ETHEL) , born i n 1 9 2 8 , and d e f e n d a n t J u a n i t a Grimm Morris 
(NITA), born in 1930. 
2 . I n 1 9 3 7 , d e f e n d a n t s JUANITA, ETHEL and NITA moved 
t o San F r a n c i s c o . GRIMM remained i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e I s l a n d s , 
and l a t e r served in the U. S. Army in the South P a c i f i c . 
3 . In 1945, p l a i n t i f f Maxine Tate Grimm (MAXINE), employed 
a s a R e c r e a t i o n a l D i r e c t o r by t h e American Red C r o s s , met 
GRIMM in the P h i l i p p i n e s . 
4 . In 1947 , w i t h o u t p e r s o n a l l y contac t ing JUANITA, GRIMM 
came t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and f i l e d a Complaint f o r Divorce 
in Reno, Nevada (PX-1). 
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5. GRIMM came to Nevada, established residency for the 
sole purpose of obtaining a divorce and other than meeting 
the divorce residency requirement, GRIMM was never an actual 
resident of Nevada. 
6. On June 2, 1947, a Decree of Divorce was entered, 
divorcing JUANITA and GRIMM (PX-3). Three weeks later, on 
June 25, 1947, GRIMM and MAXINE were married in Tooele, Utah. 
7. Following the marriage, GRIMM and MAXINE returned 
to the Philippines. They maintained homes in the Philippine 
Islands and Tooele, Utah, which homes they would occupy when 
not traveling. They occupied the home in the Philippine Islands 
most of the time except for the last two years of GRIMM'S 
life when the Grimms spent more time in Tooele, Utah. GRIMM 
died November 27, 1977, in the Philippine Islands. 
8. Two children were born to GRIMM and MAXINE, Edward 
Miller Grimm II (PETE), born in 1951, and Linda Grimm Lawyer 
(LINDA), born in 1953. 
9. In 1947, ETHEL, GRIMM'S daughter by his first marriage, 
returned to the Philippines. She married Pat McFadden an 
employee of GRIMM. They had six children by that marriage. 
She divorced Mr. McFadden and married Rex Roberts after 1947. 
10. After the Second World War, GRIMM rebuilt and developed 
his various businesses. 
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11. In 1959, GRIMM executed two wills prepared by a lawyer 
in California. The first will was referred to as the Non-Philippine 
Will (PX-6) . The second will was referred to as the Philippine 
Will (PX-7). In general under the Philippine Will ETHEL and 
NITA would receive that portion of the estate to which they 
would be entitled under Philippine law if they were compulsory 
heirs. Under the Non-Philippine Will, ETHEL and NITA would 
receive nothing. 
12. After 1959, assets situated outside the Philippines 
became significantly greater. In 1964, GRIMM organized Globe 
Investment Company, essentially a holding company * for real 
properties located in the United States. In addition, Globe 
had a wholly-owned subsidiary, Proud Porker Ranch, a hog farm 
in Tooele, Utah (DX-272, PX-12) . On the other hand, Luzon 
Stevedoring was sold in 1964 and Everett Steamship Lines in 
1976, both substantial companies owned by GRIMM and Charles 
Parsons. 
13. In the summer of 1976, GRIMM came to Utah for medical 
treatment. While in Utah, he caused a Trust Agreement to 
be prepared. 
14. On July 12, 1977, GRIMM executed the Trust Agreement 
naming PETE Trustee and MAXINE, PETE and LINDA as beneficiaries. 
When the Trust Agreement was executed, the only assets purportedly 
transferred to the Trustee were the shares of Globe Investment 
Company (PX-8). 
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15. In July of 1977, GRIMM returned to the Philippines-
He was not in good health and from September through November 
of 1977 his health deteriorated to the point that death was 
imminent. 
16. On August 16, 1977, certain assignments were executed 
by GRIMM purporting to place most Philippine assets of GRIMM 
in trust (PX-14, 15) . 
17. It is questionable if the assignments were in fact 
properly delivered to the Trustee because PETE testified that 
he placed the assignments in his dad's safety deposit box 
which was in the name of E. M. Grimm. In October or November 
of 1977 but prior to GRIMM'S death, MAXINE took the contents 
cut of GRIMM'S safety deposit box and placed the contents 
in a safety deposit box in her name. It was not until after 
the death of GRIMM that she placed the trustees name on the 
box. PETE wrote on November 14, 1977, "Before transferring 
them (stocks) I think we should get their (Kirton, McConkie) 
opinion11 (DX-302) . 
18. As previous stated, GRIMM sold his interest in Everett 
Steamship Company in 1976. At the time of his death on November 
27, 1977, GRIMM was owed.three payments of $984,092.31 each, 
due June 30, 1978, June 30, 1979, and June 30, 1980 (DX-272, 
p. 9) . GRIMM made no effort to transfer the Everett receivable 
or certain land located in Daggett County, Utah, to the Trust. 
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19. On October 1, 1977, GRIMM entered Makati Medical 
Center where he remained until his death. During that time, 
his medical condition steadily deteriorated. Prior to October 
1977, the relationship between ETHEL and REX on the one hand, 
and GRIMM, MAXINE, PETE and LINDA on the other hand, was cordial, 
friendly and close, they were all supportive and helpful of 
one another during GRIMM1S last illness. 
20. NITA'S relationship with her father and with MAXINE, 
PETE and LINDA also was a good relationship. 
21. In November 1977, just prior to GRIMM'S death NITA 
visited her father in the Makati Medical Center. Her trip 
from California was paid for by Maxine. 
22. While NITA was in the Philippines, she also visited 
with Charles Parsons and his wife. Mr. Parsons was a business 
associate, friend, and partner of GRIMM in several business 
ventures located in the Philippines and in Hong Kong, including 
G-P & Co., FEMOLA and Hong Kong Transportation Company. During 
that visit, NITA was informed by Parsons that there was a 
trust in existence and that it was unfavorable to ETKEL and 
NITA. 
23. During GRIMMfS last illness MAXINE had consulted 
with Britt McConkie, who was in the Philippine Islands for 
the L.D.S. Church and who was also a member of the law firm 
of Kirton, McConkie, Boyer and Boyle. 
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24 . In November 1977, before GRIMM'S death, -MAXINE d irec ted 
PETE, who was then r e s i d i n g i n Utah, t o c o n s u l t with Mr. McConkie's 
law f irm i n Utah and have documents prepared which would t r e a t 
ETHEL and NITA e q u a l l y w i t h PETE and LINDA, and g i v e MAXINE 
o n e - h a l f of GRIMM'S E s t a t e . 
2 5 . Pursuant t o MAXINE1S d i r e c t i o n , PETE c o n f e r r e d w i t h 
t h e f i rm of K i r t o n , McConkie, Boyer & B o y l e . PETE r e p o r t e d 
h i s c o n f e r e n c e t o GRIMM, MAXINE and LINDA by l e t t e r da ted 
November 14 , 1977 ( P X - 3 0 2 ) . New documents were prepared i n 
a c c o r d a n c e w i t h MAXINE'S d i r e c t i o n . These documents were 
s e n t t o t h e P h i l i p p i n e s b u t d i d n o t a r r i v e b e f o r e GRIMM'S 
death on November 27, 1977. 
2 6 . On December 1 , 1 9 7 7 , t h e day before MAXINE and LINDA 
l e f t f o r T o o e l e , Utah t o a t t e n d t h e f u n e r a l , REX and ETKEL 
v i s i t e d t o say g o o d b y e . At t h a t m e e t i n g , they inquired about 
a w i l l . MAXINE d e n i e d any knowledge o f a w i l l and, i n her 
own words , "blew up.1 1 I t was a v e r y e m o t i o n a l t ime f o r a l l 
invo lved and a very emotional meet ing . 
2 7 . Whi l e en r o u t e t o Utah , MAXINE wrote a l e t t e r t o 
ETKEL which s a i d , in part : 
"Dearest ETHEL -
P l e a s e f o r g i v e me f o r b l o w i n g up - I was s o 
ashamed. 
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I'B also sorry about all the mixup on the will 
bit. 
• • • 
Thanks so much for your support during those trying 
days. 
Love, 
Maxine" (PX-202) 
The letter is indicative of MAXINEfS desire to continue 
harmonious family relationships with ETHEL1S family. 
28. MAXINE also wrote REX, ETHELfS husband, thanking 
him for all his help in the past and then. (DX-287) 
29. During December 1977, the relationship between MAXINE, 
ETKEL, REX, NITA, LINDA and PETE was still cordial but strained 
due to emergence of the trust, which terms were not favorable 
to ETHEL and NITA. Correspondence and communications were 
sent and received during the month of December also showing 
a desire on behalf of all family members to resolve the matter 
amicably. (PX-75, PX-76, PX-77, PX-78) 
30. ETHEL was appointed Special Administratrix by the 
Philippine court on January 12, 1978, which was in accord 
with Mr. Salisbury's recommendation. (PX-80) On January 
18, ETHEL wrote MAXINE reporting her temporary appointment 
and informing MAXINE of the hearing date when a regular admin-
istrator would be appointed. (PX-81) 
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31. On Janaury 24, 1978, ETHEL and REX visited MAXINEfS 
house in the Philippines and without the express permission 
of MAXINE removed certain valuables from the house for safekeeping. 
An inventory was prepared of all items removed. (PX-85, 86) 
After learning of the appointment and the removal of items 
from her home, Mr. Salisbury prepared a cable to ETHEL objecting 
to the appointment and made demand that items taken from the 
house be returned. (PX-88) 
32. By January 31, 1978, Mr. Salisbury had been made 
aware by MAXINE of an income tax case concerning GRIMMfS taxes 
pending before the U. S. Tax Court, Washington, D.C., which 
was being handled by Mr. Bert Rand for GRIMM prior to GRIMM'S 
death. 
33. In January and February 1978, Mr. Salisbury was informed 
and discussed with MAXINE the fact that for Philippine estate 
tax purposes, the estate of non-citizen domiciliaries of the 
Philippines included all property of the deceased, real or 
personal, tangible or intangible wherever situated, except 
real estate located outside the Philippines and that the tax 
rate was 60 percent. (PX-272) 
34. In January or February 1978, Mrs. Maxine Grimm retained 
a lawyer in the Philippine Islands, Mr. Edgardo J. Angara. 
Mr. Salisbury and Mr. Angara exchanged telegrams and conversed 
by telephone about the numerous questions concerning the Estate, 
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including GRIMM'S domicile and the effect of Philippine domicile, 
the law of legitime by which children are compulsory heirs, 
and its effect on the trust, the Civil Law doctrine of collation, 
the assets subject to taxation in the Philippines and the 
doctrine of renvoi as applied to succession from persons having 
citizenship different from their domicile. 
On February 17, 1978, Mr. Angara telegrammed Mr. Salisbury 
as follows: 
Please advise us , therefore, whether the disposition 
made by the decedent in his Philippine wil l in accordance 
with Phillipine law are contrary to Utah law. 
(HH) We would a l s o l i k e to know from you whether 
there i s a conf l i c t of law rule in Utah providing that 
the law of the domic i le of the decedent shall govern 
success ional r ights . If there i s such a rule, and the 
Phi l ippines i s held to be the domicile of the decedent 
at the time of h i s death, the Phi l ippine courts wi l l 
accept the renvoi or the reference back to Philippine 
law, in which case the testamentary disposi t ions of the 
l a t e Mr. Grimm in h i s Philippine w i l l in accordance with 
the P h i l i p p i n e law even i f inconsistent with Utah law 
wil l be valid and operative. 
(II) We now turn to the legal e f f ec t s of the trust 
agreement executed by the la te Mr. Grimm. Under Philip-
pine law, proper t i e s transferred to a trust where the 
trustor retains the power to revoke are included as part 
of the gross es tate in determining the net estate subject 
to es tate tax. Fuirthermore, such trust properties are 
subject to co l la t ion in determining the compulsory legi-
times of the heirs. Thus, i f the transfer in trust affects 
the legitimes of the heirs, such transfer shall be accordingly 
reduced; otherwise, the properties held by the trustee 
wil l be l e f t intact. 
(FF) Under Philippine law, the order of succession, 
the amount of successional rights and the intrinsic validity 
of the nat ional law of the decedent, whatever may be 
the nature of the property and regardless of the country 
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w h e r e i n s a i d property may be found, w i t h r e s p e c t t o an 
A m e r i c a n c i t i z e n , t h e a p p l i c a b l e l a v w i l l be t h a t of 
t h e s t a t e where he i s a c i t i z e n . In t h e c a s e of t h e 
l a t e Mr. Grimm, we assume t h a t he was a c i t i z e n of t h e 
S t a t e of Utah at the time of h i s death. 
We w o u l d l i k e t o know, t h e r e f o r e , t h e Utah law on 
t h e '"order o f s u c c e s s i o n and t h e amount of s u c c e s s i o n a l 
r i g h t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y whether Utah law recognizes community 
o f p r o p e r t y b e t w e e n s p o u s e s and whether the s u r v i v i n g 
s p o u s e and t h e c h i l d r e n are c o n s i d e r e d compulsory h e i r s 
and i f s o , t h e amount of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e s u c c e s s i o n a l 
r i g h t s or what i s known in c i v i l law as compulsory l i g i t i m e s . 
In response t o t h i s quest ion from Mr. Angara, Mr. Sal isbury 
s a i d : 
I t would t h e r e f o r e be my o p i n i o n t h a t t h e P h i l i p p i n e 
W i l l s h o u l d be g o v e r n e d by P h i l i p p i n e law even though 
i n c o n s i s t e n t w i th t h e laws of the S t a t e of Utah because 
o f t h e c o n f l i c t of law r u l e r e f e r r e d t o above . P r i o r 
t o the above referred code s e c t i o n , Utah would have adopted 
t h e common law r u l e t h a t the law of the domici le contro l s 
t h e v a l i d i t y of the Will and succes s iona l r i g h t s . 
( I I ) With r e s p e c t t o t h e l e g a l e f f e c t of t h e t r u s t 
a g r e e m e n t , b o t h U. S . and Utah l a w would be t h e same 
as t h e P h i l i p p i n e law and include the a s s e t s of the t rusc 
i n the e s t a t e for death tax purposes. However, as indicated 
a b o v e , under Utah law t h e a s s e t s o f t h e t r u s t would net 
be s u b j e c t t o c o l l a t i o n i n d e t e r m i n i n g the compulsory 
share of the h e i r s . (DX-254) 
Mr. B e n a v i n c e , an a f t e r t h e f a c t w i t n e s s , was c a l l e d 
as an expert t o t e s t i f y as t o the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the Phi l ipp ine 
law i n r e g a r d s t o t h i s c a s e . Mr. Benavince t e s t i f i e d t h a t 
p u r s u a n t t o A r t i c l e 16 of t h e P h i l i p p i n e Code t h a t t h e law 
of t h e country in which the decedent i s a c i t i z e n i s the appl icable 
l a w . H o w e v e r , MAXINE, h a v i n g t h e b e n e f i t of Mr. Angara f s 
and Mr. S a l i s b u r y ' s o p i n i o n d i d e x e c u t e the family se t t l ement 
agreement. 
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At the time of GRIMM'S death, his estate, mostly personal 
property, was in excess of Eight Million Dollars, with assets 
situated in the Philippines, in Hong Kong and in the United 
States, There were numerous questions to be resolved. Mr. Salis-
bury also corresponded with an attorney in Reno, Nevada, concerning 
the validity of GRIMMfS divorce and hence the validity of 
his marriage to MAXINE. 
35. By February, 1978, Mr. Salisbury had concluded that 
it might be an advantage to work out a settlement for tax 
purposes if the trust could be left intact. (PX-254) 
36. During March 1978, Mr* Salisbury talked at least 
five times with MAXINE about legal issues concerning this 
estate and the possibility of settlement. Mr. Salisbury made 
calculations as to what ETKEL and NITA might received under 
various assumptions* MAXINE told Mr. Salisbury that ETKEL 
had presented a paper outlining a settlement proposal and 
had asked her to sign it. Mr. Salisbury advised MAXINE not 
to sign and, upon his advise, she did not do so. 
37. MAXINE was agreeable to and desirous of entering 
into an agreement, but wanted it consummated in Utah under 
Mr. Salisbury's supervision and wanted to receive her one-half 
free of tax. 
38. On March 7, 1978, MAXINE wrote Mr. Salisbury indicating 
her desire and need for a settlement. She said: 
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I am wondering if our communication is getting through. 
We understood that you were going to let us know if you 
needed the will. We could have sent it earlier if we 
had known. As you know, time is a factor with us. We 
cannot do anything until we get that court order out 
of our hair. I have talked to Ethel and she well understands 
that if we fight we can all lose, so she is agreeing 
not to fight, but I still know that there is great feeling 
there and she could turn under pressure, although I think 
she would be afraid to. I have no feeling of pressure 
anymore. I can talk without any emotional feelings, 
so I am grateful for that blessing. Peter, of course, 
has no problem. I feel good about the way he is talking. 
As soon as our position is straightened out, we can begin 
to act, and then I think we will get more cooperation. 
At this time everyone is afraid to do or say anything, 
as they know what a horrible thing it would be if the 
family fought in court—everything then would get exposed— 
good and bad. 
I feel that these lawyers are a bit puffed up with 
their name and need direction and push. They are more 
apt to follow than lead. 
Mail is very slow. We are getting ours in 2 weeks. 
You will probably get ours in 4 to 7 days. Clark Air 
Base gets theirs in 4 days, but it is a long ride up 
there to get it, however, with important papers tha~ 
is the best way I think. Sending them by courier is 
expensive—$30 plus, but we felt this was the only way 
to send the will, as we know of no one going to the States. 
Thank you so much for your interest and help. Somehow 
all of this will come out alright. Are you aware that 
Rand is coming in April?" (DX-256) 
39. In late February or early March 1978, ETHEL and NITA 
employed Mr. Donald Holbrook of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
to represent their interests in Utah. Mr. Holbrook and others 
in his office and Mr. Salisbury and others in his office communicated 
over a period of several weeks. On April 4, 1978, Mr. Holbrook's 
office and Mr. Salisburyfs office stipulated to the admission 
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o f t h e n o n - P h i l i p p i n e w i l l t o p r o b a t e i n T o o e l e County under 
c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s . (DX-260) F i n a l n e g o t i a t i o n s , w i t h REX 
r e p r e s e n t i n g ETHEL and NITA# and PETE r e p r e s e n t i n g MAXINE 
and LINDA consumed a t l e a s t f i v e d a y s , from A p r i l 20 through 
A p r i l 2 5 , 1 9 7 8 . There were a t l e a s t four r e v i s i o n s of t h e 
f i r s t d r a f t p r e p a r e d by Mr. S a l i s b u r y . (DX-261, DX-261A, 
DX-263, DX-264, DX-265) The f i n a l agreement was incorporated 
i n t o two documents, the Set t lement Agreement and the Supplemental 
Memorandum. (PX-57, 58, 59) 
4 0 . D u r i n g t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s each s i d e p r e s e n t e d p o i n t s 
and p r o p o s a l s t o a d v a n c e t h e p o s i t i o n s o f t h e i r c l i e n t s . 
PETE and Mr. S a l i s b u r y were i n s i s t e n t and t h e f i r s t w i f e , 
JUANITA, s i g n t h e agreement t o r e l i n q u i s h any claim she might 
h a v e t o t h e e s t a t e . During t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s i t was agreed 
t h a t MAXINE r e c e i v e a guaranteed miniumum of $ 1 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 p l u s 
h e r two h o u s e s and c e r t a i n bank a c c o u n t s r e g a r d l e s s of t h e 
e v e n t u a l s i z e o f t h e e s t a t e . PETE and Mr. S a l i s b u r y a l s o 
i n s i s t e d t h a t MAXINE r e c e i v e h e r share w i t h o u t r e d u c t i o n by 
way of d e a t h t a x e s . Negot ia t ions a l s o r e s u l t e d in an agreement 
t h a t PETE and LINDA r e c e i v e c e r t a i n bank a c c o u n t s and t h a t 
ETHEL and NITA be guaranteed a minimum. 
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4 1 . Mr. S a l i s b u r y communicated at l e a s t twice in April 
with MAXINE. PETE conferred with Mr. Salisbury on a continual 
b a s i s between Apri l 17 and April 25, 1978. On the morning 
prior to signing the Family Settlement Agreement PETE represented 
t o Mr. S a l i s b u r y t h a t he had d i s c u s s e d the agreement with 
h i s mother (MAXINE) the night before and that she wanted t o 
go ahead. 
4 2 . The Agreement was signed on April 25, 1978 , by PETE 
and LINDA, by PETE as a t t o r n e y - i n - f a c t for MAXINE and by REX 
as a t t o r n e y - i n - f a c t for ETHEL and NITA. I t was a l s o signed 
by b o t h a t t o r n e y s . Subsequently a copy was signed by NITA 
in California and by ETHEL and MAXINE in the Philippine Islands. 
Pursuant t o t h e Family Set t lement Agreement, Mr. Sal isbury 
was r e t a i n e d as at torney for the Es ta te to represent a l l of 
the "heirs". 
4 3 . The Family S e t t l e m e n t Agreement was not s igned as 
a r e s u l t of threats , duress or coercion. MAXINE was represented 
by Mr. S a l i s b u r y who advised Mrs. Maxine Grimm that he had 
i n v e s t i g a t e d the claims made by NITA and ETHEL and she did 
not have t o enter i n t o a s e t t l ement agreement i f she did not 
des ire to do so . 
44 . The Family Sett lement Agreement was incorporated into 
two s e p a r a t e documents to preserve maximum f l e x i b i l i t y for 
f i l i n g of s ta te tax returns. 
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45. During the negotiations and afterward, there was a 
discussion about the desirability of presenting the Family 
Settlement Agreement to the court for approval. Mr. Salisbury 
concluded that it was not unusual not to file the Family Settlement 
Agreement. Mr. Salisbury also stated that the tax consequences 
were a consideration for not filing the Family Settlement 
Agreement with the court for approval. 
46. Mr. Salisbury concluded that it was not in the interest 
of the estate to make the agreement a matter of public record 
at that time. It was preferable to preserve maximum flexibility 
fcr the Estate and all signatories to the Agreement. 
47. Subsequent to the signing of the Settlement Agreement, 
all of the parties worked toward and pursuant to the Agreement. 
48. On May 4, 1978, MAXINE and ETHEL jointly retained 
the accounting firm of Price Waterhouse to be Estate Accountant. 
(DX-213) 
49. On May 19, 1978, MAXINE, PETE and ETHEL filed a Joint 
Petition for Letters of Administration in accordance with 
the terms of the Agreement (DX-214) , which Petition was granted 
and Joint Letters issued on July 2, 1978 (DX-218) 
50. On June 27, 1978,. MAXINE wrote NITA a letter expressing 
her pleasure with the Agreement and that "much money will 
be saved1 because of it. (DX-292) 
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51. In August 1978, MAXINE borrowed $500,000 from Globe 
Investment Company, an asset of the estate, and before liquid 
funds became available, Globe was required to borrow money 
ar 9.65%, (DX-293, DX-371) 
52. On September 20, 1978, Mr. Salisbury wrote to the 
beneficiaries again reaffirming the Agreement (DX-221) . This 
letrer is the first of a number of reports to the beneficiaries 
by Mr. Salisbury concerning the progress of the Estate pursuant 
to the Family Settlement Agreement. At no time did MAXINE, 
PETE or LINDA take exception to any of the reports of Mr. Salisbury. 
53. In February, 1979, MAXINE obtained an Order for a 
family allowance of $3000 per month retroactive to the date 
of GRIMM'S death. 
54. Also in February, 1979, the U. S. Estate Tax Return 
was signed by MAXINE and filed. The estate tax issue was 
simplified and aided by the Family Settlement Agreement in 
the opinion of Mr. Salisbury. Under the return MAXINE claimed 
the maximum marital deduction. 
55. In November, 1978, Mr. Salisbury visited MAXINE in 
the Philippine Islands. Again, there was no indication by 
MAXINE during that meeting that she wanted to repudiate the 
Settlement Agreement. 
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5 6 , On May 23, 1979, $800,000 of the Everett r e c e i a b l e 
was distributed in accordance with the Family Settlement Agreement 
and i n t h e p e r c e n t a g e s designated by the Family Set t lement 
Agreement: $400,000 to MAXINE and $100,000 each to the four 
c h i l d r e n . In a d d i t i o n p e a r l s and s i l v e r were d i s t r i b u t e d 
in accordance to the terms of the Family Settlement Agreement* 
5 7 . In September,1979, the Phi l ipp ine e s t a t e taxes were 
p a i d . Because there were not s u f f i c i e n t l i q u i d funds to pay 
a l l of the e s t a t e taxes due, the s h o r t f a l l was paid by the 
r e s p e c t i v e b e n e f i c i a r i e s in accordance with their shares under 
the Family Settlement Agreement. 
5 3 . In August, 1979, Mr. Sal i sbury again v i s i t e d MAXINE 
i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e Is lands and t rave led with MAXINE to Hong 
Kong. 
5 9 . In September, 1979 , Mr. Sa l i sbury , as part of h i s 
regular reports , provided for a plan of part i t ion in accordance 
w i t h t h e Family Se t t l ement Agreement. Again, no o b j e c t i o n 
was made by MAXINE, PETE or LINDA. (DX-241) 
60 . On October 1, 1979, MAXINE wrote ETHEL s t a t i n g t h a t 
soon the benef ic iaries would have the actual part i t ion. 
61 . After October, 1979, MAXINE did nothing to cause the 
part i t ion of the estate to occur. 
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62 . MAXINE did not f i l e an inventory in the Utah Probate 
proceeding, and attempted to block any progress toward part i t ion 
by f a i l i n g to communicate with ETHEL and NITA. 
6 3 . On May 14 , 1980 , a P e t i t i o n for Removal was f i l e d 
on behal f of ETHEL and NITA request ing MAXINE to be removed 
as P e r s o n a l R e p r e s e n t a t i v e and r e q u e s t i n g d i s t r i b u t i o n in 
accordance with the Family Settlement Agreement. 
64. On June 13, 1980, Mr. Rand wrote Mr. Salisbury informing 
Mr. S a l i s b u r y t h a t MAXINE, PETE and LINDA were repudiat ing 
the Agreement. 
65 . With more spec i f i c reference to the claim for reciss ion 
of the Family Settlement Agreement, the court finds: 
A. The d e f e n d a n t s d id not breach any cf the terms 
of the Family Settlement Agreement. 
B. Defendants in good f a i t h be l i eved that the claims 
t h e y a s s e r t e d r e g a r d i n g p o s s i b l e i n v a l i d i t y of the t r u s t , 
poss ible inval id i ty of GRIMMfS divorce and ef fect of application 
of P h i l i p p i n e law were l e g i t i m a t e c la ims . The c laims were 
of such mer i t t h a t Mr. Sal i sbury researched the i s s u e s and 
advised MAXINE and PETE accordingly. 
C. Defendants did not know that the claims they asserted 
were unfounded. I t i s not necessary to f ind whether they 
were or were not unfounded. 
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D. None of the plaintiffs was put in such fear as to 
overcome their free will or to compel them to act against 
their will. 
66. Although MAXINE from time-to-time felt under some 
pressure, it was not of the kind or intensity sufficient to 
deprive her of her free will during the period prior to the 
execution of the Family Settlement Agreement, particularly 
in view of the fact that discussions and negotiations extended 
over a period of approximately three months during which time 
MAXINE had the benefit of the advice of Mr. Salisbury in the 
United States and Mr. Angara in the Philippines. 
67. The execution of the Family Settlement Agreement by 
the plaintiffs was not the result of duress, coercion or fraud 
upon the part of one or more of the defendants. 
68. After the execution of the Family Settlement Agreement, 
although both ETHEL and MAXINE exerienced dissatisfaction 
with the progress in closing the estate, MAXINE was not under 
duress or coercion to deprive her of her free will and she 
was physically and mentally able to attempt to rescind the 
Family Settlement Agreement, had she desired to do so even 
though there was no legal or equitable basis for doing so. 
69. With more specific reference to the claims of lack 
or failure of consideration the court finds: 
A. Mutual forbearance to prosecute claims; 
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B. Mutual promises f o r the sake of family harmony 
cons t i tu te consideration; 
C. Both s i d e s of the controversy rece ived b e n e f i t s 
from t h e Family S e t t l e m e n t . L i t i g a t i o n was avoided ( u n t i l 
r e p u d i a t i o n ) . Expense was minimized ( u n t i l repudiat ion) . 
The p a r t i e s were uni ted in dea l ing with tax ing a u t h o r i t i e s 
and with the Parsons. MAXINE received the residences. MAXINE 
r e c e i v e d a minimum guarantee. MAXINE got her share free of 
tax. Philippine estate tax was reduced by making i t unnecessary 
for ETKEL and NITA to claimn e n t i r e e s t a t e , except for r e a l 
e s t a t e in Daggett County subject to distr ibut ion (and taxation) 
under lav of the Phil ippines. 
70 . With re spec t t o the Family Sett lement Agreement, and 
w i t h s p e c i f i c reference to the Supplemental Memorandum, the 
court f inds: 
A. The terms of t h e compromise of the controversy 
concerning the es tate of GRIMM have been set forth in an agreement 
in w r i t i n g ( t h e S e t t l e m e n t Agreement and the Supplemental 
Memorandum) executed by a l l persons having benefic ial in teres t s 
or c la ims which are or may be a f f e c t e d by the compromise as 
required by Section 75-3-1102(a) U.C.A., 1953. 
B. Said agreement was presented to the court by p l a i n t i f f s 
by re ference t o t h e i r claim of a right to rescind. Defendants 
asked the court by answer to enforce the agreement in accordance 
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with its terms. Later defendants by way of amendment specifically 
asked the court to approve the Family Settlement Agreement. 
Said agreement is properly before the court and has already 
been signed by MAXINE as personal representative and by PETE 
as trustee• 
C. All interested persons have had notice, 
D. The contest or controversy was and is in good faith 
and the effect of the agreement upon the interests of persons 
affected is just and reasonable. 
E. The Family Settlement Agreement specifically provides 
that the parties to the agreement shall execute any and all 
additional documents of every nature and description which 
may be reasonably required to carry out the terms, provisions 
and intentions of the Agreement. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes 
and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. At the time of the execution of the Power of Attorney 
in favor of Pete, and at the time he executed the Family Settlement 
Agreement, pursuant to the Power of Attorney and at the time 
she personally executed the Family Settlement Agreement, MAXINE 
was not acting under fraud, duress or coercion. 
2. At the time of executing the Family Settlement Agreement, 
neither PETE nor LINDA was acting under fraud, duress or coercion. 
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3. The Family Settlement Agreement-is supported by good 
and sufficient consideration and is a valid and binding agreement. 
4. Following the execution of the Family Settlement 
Agreement there was no failure of consideration or breach 
of the Family Settlement Agreement by ETKEL or NITA or JUANITA. 
5. Following the execution of the Family Settlement 
Agreement the parties acted in conformity therewith for a 
period of approximately 20 months during which time the plaintiffs 
received certain benefits and the defendants made changes 
in position to their detriment in reliance upon the provisions 
of the Family Settlement Agreement. 
6. If the plaintiffs had grounds to set the Family Settlement 
Agreement aside at the time of its execution, which the court 
concludes they did not, such grounds were waived by the subsequent 
conduct of the plaintiffs. 
7. If the plaintiffs had grounds to set the Family Settlement 
Agreement aside at the time of its execution, which the court 
concludes they did not, plaintiffs have ratified and affirmed 
the Family Settlement Agreement. 
8. The Family Settlement Agreement was not subject to 
repudiation without legal consequences prior to approval by 
the court. Failure to obtain court approval does not invalidate 
the Family Settlement Agreement. The Family Settlement Agreement 
could be presented to the court for approval at any time prior 
to distribution and closing of the estate. 
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9. The Family Settlement Agreement is just and reasonable 
and should be approved and all fiduciaries under the supervision 
of this court should be directed to administer and distribute 
the estate in accordance with the terms of the Family Settlement 
Agreement. 
Dated this -^ day of 
J 
, 1986, 
BY THE COURT 
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Tab 3 
HAROLD G. CHRTSTENSEN #AC638 
DAVID W. SLAGLE #2575 
R. BRENT STEPHENS #A309t> 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MAR1INEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
.: * 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter cf the Estate of 
EDWARD MILLER GRIMM, 
Deceased. 
Probate No. 3720 
MAXINE TATE GRIMM,, 
individually and as 
Supervised Personal 
Representative of th< Estate 
of Edward Miller Griiranr 
LINDA GRIMM; EDWARD MILLER 
GRIMM, II; and E. LaVAR TATE, 
as Supervised Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of Edward Miller Griiran, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS, REX 
ROBERTS, JUANITA GRIMM 
MORRIS and JUANITA KEGLEY 
GRIMM, 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-80-0322 
Judge John Rokich 
Defendants. 
On August 6, 1985, this cause came on regularly for trial 
before The Honorable John A. Rokich, District Judge. Plaintiffs 
were represented by Daniel L. Berman, of Berman & Anderson. 
Defendants Roberts and Morris were represented by Harold G. 
Christensen and R. Brent Stephens, of Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau. Defendant Juanita Kegley Grimm was represented by 
David M. Eckersley, of Houpt & Eckersley. Although the princi-
pal issue in dispute was the validity of the Family Settlement 
Agreement, a jury was duly impaneled to try any issues appro-
priate for jury determination after resolution of the validity 
issue. The Court and jury heard the testimony of witnesses, 
exhibits were offered and received as evidence, and upon both 
sides having rested, and motions for directed verdicts having 
been made, and the trial court concluding that judgment should 
be entered for defendants herein in accordance with the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed heretofore, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The Family Settlement Agreement is a valid and binding 
agreement. 
2. The Family Settlement Agreement is just and reasonable 
and, to the extent approval is necessary, the Family Settlement 
Agreement is hereby approved by the Court. 
3. All fiduciaries under supervision of this Court are 
hereby directed to administer and distribute the Estate in 
accordance with the terms of the Family Settlement Agreement. 
4. Plaintiffs1 Complaint is hereby dismissed on the merits, 
5. To the extent of the relief granted in paragraphs 1, 
2 and 3, defendants are awarded judgment on their Counterclaim. 
6. Defendants' claim for attorneys' fees is denied. 
7. Defendants are awarded their costs. 
Dated this Z ^ day of /£{? n ' , 1986. 
J 
BY THE COURT: 
fcA. a (R.JUL 
Vj John A. Rokich District Judge 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Tooele ) ss 
DENNIS D. EWWG, County Clerk and Ex-Offick> Clerk of the District Court of 
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that the same is a fu*, true and correct trans^ $ therefrom and of the whole of 
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!N WITNESS W ^ ^ E D E y - y ^ ;i|reuntc set my hand and offWal 
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Re No. llM Clerk 
Original R e d . 
^
 6, < i i i / n ^ ,•( hi lifth Ly 
- 3 -
Tab 4 
75-3-1101 PROBATE OF WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION 
Part 11 
Compromise of Controversies 
75-3-1101. Effect of approval of agreements involving trusts, in-
alienable interests, or interests of third persons.—A compromise of any 
controversy as to admission to probate of any instrument offered for 
formal probate as the will of'a decedent, the construction, validity,, or 
effect of any probated will, the rights or interests in the estate of the 
decedent, any successor, or the administration of the estate, if ap-
proved in a formal proceeding in the court for that purpose, is binding 
on all the parties thereto, including those unborn, unascertained, or 
who could not be located. An approved compromise is binding even 
though it may affect a trust or an inalienable interest. A compromise 
does not impair the rights of creditors or of taxing authorities who are 
not parties to it. 
History: C 1953, 75-3-1101, enacted Claim against estate, power and re-
by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 4. sponsibility of executor or administrator 
to compromise, 72 A. L. R. 2d 243. 
Collateral References* Claim due estate, power and responsi-
Compromise and Settlement<S=Dl et bility of executor or administrator to 
seq.; Executors and Administrators^S?. compromise, 72 A. L. R. 2d 191. 
15A CJ.S. Compromise and Settlement Death: power and responsibility of ex-
§ 1 et seq.; 33 CJ.S. Executors and Ad- ecutor or administrator as to compro-
ministrators § 181. mise or settlement of action or cause 
31 Am. Jur. 2d 135, Executors and of action for death, 72 A. L. R. 2d 285. 
Administrators § 258; 80 Am. Jur. 2d 217, Intestate estate, family settlement of. 
Wills § 1099. 29 A. L. R. 3d 174. 
Also see Am. Jur. 2d, New Topic Serv-
ice, Uniform Probate Code. 
Tab 5 
75-3-1102 PROBATE OF WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION 
Part 11 
Compromise of Controversies 
75-3-1102. Procedure for securing court approval of compromise.— 
(1) The procedure for securing court approval of a compromise is as 
follows: 
(a) The terms of the compromise shall be set forth in an agreement 
in writing which shall be executed by all competent persons and parents 
acting for any minor child having beneficial interests or having claims 
which will or may be affected by the compromise. Execution is not re-
quired by any person whose identity cannot be ascertained or whose 
whereabouts is unknown and cannot reasonably be ascertained. 
(b) Any interested person, including the personal representative 
or a trustee, then may submit the agreement to the court for its ap-
proval and for execution by the personal representative, the trustee 
of every affected testamentary trust, and other fiduciaries and repre-
sentatives. 
(c) After notice to all interested persons or their representatives, 
including the personal representative of the estate and all affected 
trustees of trusts, the court, if it finds that the contest or controversy 
is in good faith and that the effect of the agreement upon the interests 
of persons represented by fiduciaries or other representatives is just 
and reasonable, may make an order approving the agreement and di-
recting all fiduciaries under its supervision to execute the agreement. 
Minor children represented only by their parents may be bound only 
if their parents join with other competent persons in execution of the 
compromise. Upon the making of the order and the execution of the 
agreement, all further disposition of the estate is in accordance with 
the terms of the agreement. 
History: C 1953, 75-3-1102, enacted trustees from vetoing any such proposal, 
by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 4. The only reason for approving a scheme 
«*• . «« M * °f devolution which differs from that 
Editorial Board Comment framed by the testator or the statutes 
This section and the one preceding it governing intestacy is to prevent dissipa-
outline a procedure which may be initi- tion of the estate in wasteful litigation. 
ated by competent parties having bene- Because executors and trustees may have 
ficial interests in a decedent's estate as an interest in fees and commissions 
a means of resolving controversy con- which they might earn through efforts 
cerning the estate. If all competent per- to carry out testator's intention, the 
sons with beneficial interests or claims judgment of the court is substituted for 
which might be affected by the proposal that of such fiduciaries in appropriate 
and parents properly representing inter- cases, A controversy which the court 
ests of their children concur, a settle- may find to be in good faith, as well 
ment scheme differing from that other- as concurrence of all beneficially inter-
wise governing the devolution may be ested and competent persons and parent-
substituted. The procedure for securing representatives provide prerequisites 
representation of minors and unknown or which should prevent the procedure from 
missing persons with interests must be being abused. Thus, the procedure does 
followed. See section 75-1-403. The ulti- not threaten the planning of a testator 
mate control of the question of whether who plans and drafts with sufficient clar-
the substitute proposal shall be accepted ity and completeness to eliminate the 
is with the court which must find: "that possibility of good faith controversy con-
the contest or controversy is in good cerning the meaning and legality of his 
faith and that the effect of the agree- plan. 
ment upon the interests of parties repre- See section 75-1-403 for rules govern-
sented by fiduciaries is just and reason- ing representatives and appointment of 
able." guardians ad litem. 
The thrust of the procedure is to put These sections are modeled after See-
the authority for initiating settlement tion 93 of the Model Probate Code. Cora-
proposals with the persons who have parable leg is lat ive provisions have 
Tab 6 
PROVISIONS RELATING TO DISTRIBUTION 75-3-912 
75-3-912* Private agreements ^mong successors to decedent binding 
on personal representative.—Subject to the rights of creditors and taxing 
authorities, competent successors may agree among themselves to alter 
the interests, shares, or amounts to which they are entitled under 
the will of the decedent, or under the laws of intestacy, in any way that 
they provide in a written contract executed bv all who are affected by 
its provisions- The personal representative shall abide by the terms 
of the agreement, subject to his obligation to administer the estate 
for the benefit of creditors, to pay all taxes and costs of administration, 
and to carry out the responsibilities of his office for the benefit of any 
successors of the decedent who are not parties. Personal representa-
tives of decedents' estates are not required to see to the performance 
of trusts if the trustee thereof is another person who is willing to 
accept the trust. Accordingly, trustees of a testamentary trust are 
successors for the purposes of this section. Nothing contained in this 
section relieves trustees of any duties owed to beneficiaries of trusts. 
History: C 1953, 75-3-912, enacted 
by L. 1975, ch. 150, §4, 
Editorial Board Comment. 
It may be asserted that this section is 
only a restatement of the obvious and 
should be omitted. Its purpose, however, 
is to make it clear that the successors 
to an. estate have residual control over 
the way it is to be distributed. Hence, 
they may compel a personal representa-
tice to administer and distribute as they 
may agree and direct. Successors should 
compare the consequences and possible 
advantages of careful use of the power 
to renounce as described by section 75-
2-801 with the effect of agreement under 
this section. The most obvious difference 
is that an agreement among successors 
under this section would involve trans-
fers by some participants to the extent 
it changed the pattern of distribution 
from that otherwise applicable. 
Differing from a pattern that is fa-
miliar in many states, this Code does 
not subject testamentary trusts and 
trustees to special statutory provisions, 
or supervisory jurisdiction. A testamen-
tary trustee is treated as a devisee with 
special duties which are of no particular 
concern to the personal representative. 
Chapter 7 contains optional procedures 
extending the safeguards available to 
personal representatives to trustees of 
both inter vivos and testamentary trusts. 
Collateral References. 
Compromise or settlement by statutory 
beneficiaries without assent of personal 
representative of death action com-
menced by latter, 29 A. L. R. 2d 1452. 
Family settlement of testator's estate, 
29A.L.R.3d8. 
Post-mortem payment or performance, 
validity of agreement between beneficiar-
ies as affected by provision for, 1 A. L. R. 
2d 1270. 
Tab 7 
ART. I, § 10 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec, 10, [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In 
courts of general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist 
of eight jurors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of 
four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil 
cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases 
shall be waived unless demanded. 
Comparable Provision. 
Montana Const., Art. Ill, §23. 
